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Neil Duxburyt
INTRODUCTION

I sometimes play a game with students which begins with
my asking why we might ever wish to protect the tenure and
rent levels of private sector residential tenants. When the law
grants such protections, I argue, the supply of leasehold accommodation is likely to be reduced. After all, if the law is biased
in favour of the tenant, who wants to be a landlord? Rather
than accord tenants the rights to security of tenure and a "fair
rent" (the principal protections embodied in the Rent Act
1977' and its predecessor statutes), it is far wiser to enact
legislation along the lines of Part I of the Housing Act

* @1995 Neil Duxbury. All Rights Reserved.
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1988 2-legislation which not only makes less difficult the repossession of premises by landlords but which also allows rents
to find their own market levels.3 While such "landlord-friendly" legislation may harm tenants in the short run, in the long
term it can only work to their benefit, for it creates an incentive for people to become landlords, thereby generating market
expansion and increased competition. If the market does grow
larger and more competitive, I conclude, not only will the supply of accommodation be increased but standards will gradually improve and rents will come down. Legislation favouring
landlords will prove equally favourable to tenants.
It almost goes without saying that few students are impressed by this argument. Attempting to bolster it with references to studies proclaiming the harmful effects of rent control
in particular does little if anything to change their minds--they
know full well that one may just as easily point to a body of
literature extolling the virtues of rent regulation.4 The claim
that the argument has a clear logic about it is also treated
summarily. Even if they have not read Holmes, they sense that
law is primarily a matter of experience rather than logic.'
Indeed, many of them, being tenants, speak from experience:
on the basis of experience, they tell me that my argument-founded, as it is, on the premise that an expanded market is necessarily a more competitive market-is blind to the
fact that possibilities for competition may be stifled by the
existence of oligopoly or even monopoly; that I take no account
of the gross disparity between supply of and demand for private sector rented accommodation; and that this disparity not
only reflects the general difference in bargaining power between landlord and tenant but makes nonsense of the idea
that deregulation will facilitate the evolution of a market in
which the respective parties negotiate freely and on equal

Housing Act, 1988, Part 1 (Eng.).
' For an overview of this legislation, see Martin Davey, The Housing Act 1988,
52 MOD. L. REV. 661 (1989).

1 With regard to the likely effects of the Housing Act 1988 in particular, for
example, compare Robert Albon & David C. Stafford, Rent Control: Its Costly Repercussions, 22 Soc. POLY & ADMIN. 10 (1988) with John Ivatts, Rented Housing
and Market Rents: A Social Policy Critique, 22 SOC. POLlY & ADMIN. 197 (1988).
See OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolf Howe, od.,
1963).
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terms.6 They also tell me that my argument takes no account
of either freehold residential property or public sector accommodation-that I treat the private residential tenancy market
as if it exists in isolation-and that I slip from talking about
leasehold regulation generally to rent control in particular. To
claim that leasehold deregulation will facilitate competitionwhich in turn will lead to lower prices and improved standards
for tenants-is, I am told, to pay little attention to the realities
of either the market or the landlord-tenant relationship. This
sort of talk may seduce jurisprudence teachers, but people
more accustomed to operating in the real world can see
through such an argument in a matter of seconds.
At this stage in the discussion, I try to shift the justificatory burden onto the student. Even if we concede that there are
problems with the argument in favour of deregulation, I suggest, that concession does not in itself justify the regulation of
tenure and rents. Regulation brings its own problems. For
example, under what circumstances might a landlord justifiably evict a tenant or raise a rent? What if the law is overzealous in its protection of the tenant? Are we not in fact
harming tenants if we protect them to such a degree that potential landlords are disinclined to put their properties on the
market? If one dismisses the proposal for deregulation, one
might be expected to construct an argument which justifies
some form of regulation: what is that argument?

The term "deregulation" is used here to denote not the removal of all regulation but the replacement of one particular set of regulatory provisions with another set which is considered to be somehow less stringent. When my students
refer to the Housing Act 1988 as a deregulatory statute, they mean not that the

statute removes all regulation of private sector leasehold accommodation, but that,
as compared with the Rent Act 1977, it constitutes a "weaker"-les interventionist-form of legislation. When discussing markets, it seems inevitable that the
term deregulation is used in this fashion-that is, to denote less as opposed to no
regulation-for markets are only made possible by the elistenca of regulation,
principally in the form of contract, tort and property law. American legal theorists

seem particularly fond of stressing this point. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HALE, FREEDOMI
THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER 542-48 (1952);
CASS . SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 5-6 (1993). The asumption that
deregulation necessarily reduces the level of state intervention is it.olf contentious,
given that deregulatory initiatives invariably require that government remains
involved in the monitoring and structuring of those activities which are no longer

regulated. See Colin Scott, Privatizatlon, Control, and Acountabiity, in CORPORATE
CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMCS OF
REGULATION 231-34, 245 (Joseph McCahery et al. eds., 1993).
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There are, of course, no simple answers to these questions.
Having dismissed the case for deregulation, students suddenly
find themselves struggling to formulate reasons for retaining
legislation akin to the Rent Act 1977. While the discussion
becomes inevitably very disorganised and vague, one argument
seems frequently to surface: that it would be wrong not to
regulate tenure and rent levels in a manner sympathetic to
residential tenants because it is often the case that their tenancies are somehow a part of themselves. That is, a residential
tenancy is not simply an abstract property right; rather, it is a
home-a place upon which one depends, in which one invests
and to which one usually becomes attached. The deregulatory
perspective ignores this argument and instead ensures that the
security desired by many private sector residential tenants is
made dependent upon their capacity to compete in the residential leasehold market. The residential tenancy, rather than
being conceived as a home, is treated as a mere commodity.
Accordingly, the basic problem with Part I of the Housing Act
1988--with the replacement of security of tenure and fair rents
with assured tenancies and market rents-is that it is founded
on an inappropriate valuation of the residential lease as a
property right.
While I am not at all convinced by this argument, I think
it points to a problem which legal theorists in the United
States have only recently begun to confront and which in this
country has been all but overlooked. The problem concerns the
limits of market reasoning. Some things are simply not for
sale, either because they cannot be bought and sold or because
there exist strong feelings that they should not be bought and
sold. Love, friendship, human beings, votes, exemption from
jury service, political influence (including, it seems, parliamentary questions), marriage and procreation rights-these are
but some examples of the sorts of things that are generally
considered, for one reason or another, to lie outside of the
market.8 The precise scope of the market is, of course, unclear,
" This issue being especially prominent in the British press at the time of
writing. See Nicholas Wood & Andrew Pierce, Suspension for Two As in Cash
Row, THE TIMES, July 11, 1994, at 1; Robert Rhodes James, A Question of Respect
for the House, THE TIMES, July 12, 1994 at 18.
' For further examples and discussion, see AMITAI EIPZONI, THE MORAL DIMENSION: TOWARD A NEW ECONOMICS 77-83 (1988); STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE
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and even things which fall within its domain may be distinguishable. This is the point that my students are stressing
when they argue for fair rents and security of tenure: their
claim is that while there obviously exists a market for residential leases, the belief that this type of lease confers upon the
tenant a property right which is neither fungible nor commercial but peculiarly personal in nature suggests that it ought to
be accorded special protection within the marketplace. Just as
we may believe that some things are not or ought not to be
alienable, we may also believe that certain things, although
alienable, must be considered to embody more than merely
their market value if we are to deter unconscionability within
the market domain.
In various ways, legal systems reflect such beliefs-consider, for example, laws preventing the sale of certain
things (such as human organs9 ) or establishing peculiar conditions which emphasise the special value placed on that which
is being sold (for instance, the requirement that conveyances of
legal estate be by deed"). That these sorts of beliefs are supported by law will sometimes be a source of dispute: that is,
disagreements may arise over the issue of just what ought to
be kept apart from, or accorded special protection within, the
market domain. The basic purpose of this article is to highlight
certain of these disputes with a view to determining why we
might ever wish to accord special protections within the marketplace, and why it is that certain things might be considered
inappropriate for market exchange. The question of just how
far we should go to protect the tenure and rent levels of tenants is one such dispute; two others on which I focus are, first,
the debate over whether we should permit markets in parental
and surrogacy rights and, secondly, the question of whether it
is ever appropriate to sell human tissues and organs for trans-

INCENTiVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONLIENr 54-83 (1981); MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 100-03 (1983); Caw
Sunstein, Disrupting Voluntary Transactions, in NOMOS

I .MARKETS AND JUS-

TICE 279, 292-94 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eda., 1989).
See HUMAN ORGAN TRANSPLANTS ACT, 1989, cl. 31 § 1() (Eng.).
See LAW OF PROPERTY ACT, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 20, § 52(1) (Eng.).
Reflection of nonmarket value is only one of various reazons for the deed requirement here. Other reasons for the requirement include impossibility of delivery of
that which is transacted and prevention of fraud and mistake.
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plantation.
In the process of developing this discussion, I shall present
two arguments. The first argument-what might be termed the
argument from incommensurability-is that there exists an
important distinction between the potential for applying market reasoning to particular legal and ethical disputes and the
appropriateness of applying that type of reasoning to those
disputes. We can nearly always devise market solutions to
legal problems; however, such solutions will sometimes appear
unsatisfactory because market reasoning will seem inapt for
evaluating the particular problem under consideration. Economists-particularly Chicago neo-classical economists-have
made immense strides in demonstrating the market dimen-

sions of all sorts of human activity; and, without doubt, many
of these initiatives have proved highly illuminating." There
are occasions, nevertheless, when such initiatives generate
conclusions which might be considered inappropriate because

market reasoning is able to provide only a limited or impoverished account of the particular issue at stake.12
However-and this is my second argument-while market
reasoning may have its limits, I think that there has been a
tendency, especially among academic lawyers, simply to as' There is a vast literature which might be cited here. The primary texts are
undoubtedly GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAILY (enlarged ed. Harvard
UP, 1991); GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOUR
(1976); and RICHARD A. POsNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).

' Obviously, this is a point which should become clearer as the discussion
unfolds. For the moment, however, consider Posner's explanation of "kinky" sex in
market terms:

Married men and men with steady girlfriends have all the "normal" sex
they want, at home, more or less for free, and if these are companionato
relationships, it is better sex than with prostitutes. Since prostitutes
cannot underprice the wives or girlfriends, they have an incentive to
differentiate their services-to offer something for which married men
and men with steady girlfriends will pay because they do not have access
to the identical service in the (free) home market.
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 132 (1992). This passage illustrates, I think,
how a particular form of market-reasoning price theory, in this instance, may have
considerable explanatory power and yet also be considered to imply an inappropriate valuation: in this case, the inappropriate valuation stems from the representation of women--qua prostitutes, wives and girlfriends-as a sex market for men.
Of course, price theory is not alone in representing women in this fashion; marxist
theory, for example, lends itself to much the same representation. On this point,
see LUCE IRIGARAY, THIS SEX WHICH IS NOT ONE 170-91 (Catherine Porter trans.,
1985).
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sume rather than to test those limits. The claim-prevalent in a
good deal of recent American jurisprudential literature-that
market reasoning offers only simplistic solutions to ethical and
legal dilemmas can be easily, and indeed often is, exaggerated.
Focusing on arguments from incommensurability, I shall try to
demonstrate that assumptions about the inappropriateness of
market-based valuations often turn out to be ill-founded.
This Article is concerned, accordingly, with the relationship between regulation and valuation. When the law stipulates that particular goods or activities ought to be kept outside of, or accorded special protection within, the domain of the
market, it provides, in effect, that monetary valuations cannot
do justice to the goods or activities in question. But why might
monetary valuations ever be considered inappropriate? In the
first part of this Article, I shall try to demonstrate that one
answer to this question may be derived from a particular theoretical perspective on property rights-a perspective which
emphasises the relationship between the right to private property and personal self-development. While many a criticism
might be levelled at this perspective, I shall argue it nevertheless provides a useful starting point for trying to understand
why certain things may be considered unsuited to the market
domain.
I. PROPERTY AND PERSONHOOD

It is not uncommon to hear victims of burglary remark
that while the theft of objects such as one's television and
compact-disc player is an awful inconvenience, what really
hurts is the taking of those things which have an irreplaceable
sentimental or personal value. Since the early 1980s, Margaret
Jane Radin has been using this elementary insight-that we
place different values on different types of property-as the
foundation for a theory concerning the regulation of private
property rights.'3 Radin's theory is premised on a broad dis' See ATARGARET J. RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993) [hereinafter "IREINTERPRETING PROPERTYI. This book is comprised mainly of previoualy publinhd

essays, the earliest of which appeared in 1982. Radin has referred to her permpc-

tive as representing only "a partial theory." See Margaret J. Radin, Proceedings of
the Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitution, 41 U. MU

L. REV.

49, 67 (1986). There are, so far as I can see, two distinct eanse3 in which Radins
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tinction between personal and fungible property. In developing
her theory, the subject on which she has focused principally is
rent control. While I consider Radin's arguments about rent
control to be highly disputable, I believe that her theory offers
some intriguing insights concerning the appropriate use of
market reasoning in relation to particular ethical and legal
dilemmas.
Radin rejects the utilitarian and natural-rights theories of
property and instead develops a "personhood" theory which,
she claims, is broadly attributable to Hegel. 4 Although the

theory might be described as partial. First, the theory is partial in that Radin
limits her discussion to property rights, even though the perspective which she
adopts may be considered to be but an instance of a more general theory of
rights. For attempts to broaden the implications of Radin's peropective-particularly in relation to American constitutional issues-see Bruce
Ackerman, LiberatingAbstraction, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 317, 342-46 (1992) (arguing
that personal freedoms ought to be recognised as personal property rights); C.
Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (1976) (arguing that commercial speech, unlike other forms of speech,
tends to be economic rather than personal in nature and therefore does not deserve the same degree of constitutional protection); ; Stephen Cherensky, A Penny
for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood,81 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1993) (arguing that present methods of
resolving disputes between corporations and their inventor-employees are ineffective and applying Radin's approach to the problem). Radin's theory might also be
considered partial in the sense that it is but part of a more general effort by
certain American legal theorists to demonstrate the shortcomings of the neo-classical economic approach to property rights. For other studies within this tradition,
studies which contain conclusions similar to those reached by Radin (but which
eschew personhood theory), see Charles Fried, Difficulties in the Economic Analysis
of Rights, in MARKETS AND MORALM 175 (Gerald Dworkin et al eds., 1977); Frank
I. Michelman, DiscretionaryInterests-Takings, Motives, and Unconstitutional Conditions: Commentary on Radin and Sullivan, 55 ALB. L. REV. 619 (1995); Frank I.
Micheman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS,
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982);
Frank I. Michelman, Property as a ConstitutionalRight, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1097 (1981); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy,
1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 659. In her recent writings, Radin herself has attempted to
demonstrate how her arguments concerning the regulation of private property
rights can be seen to tie in with certain aspects of feminist and pragmatist theory.
See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Evaluating Government Reasons for Changing Property Regimes, 55 ALB. L. REv. 597 (1992); Margaret J. Radin & Frank Michelman,
Pragmatistand PoststructuralistCritical Legal Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1019,
1033-35 (1991); Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 So. CAL.
L. REV. 1699 (1990).
" Radin clearly dissociates herself from the utilitarian and natural rights traditions (see RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 105-19), but on

the subject of Hegel she is less unequivocal. She notes that her "view that persons
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concept of personhood figures in classical philosophy and theology,' 5 in the United States in particular it has come to figure
in modem debates over subjects as diverse as abortion, corporate responsibility and gay and lesbian rights."6 Given its
range of application, it is hardly surprising that the concept
should conceal a multiplicity of meanings." Radin herself
does not attempt to define personhood. Rather, she simply
asserts that personhood is embodied in property rights: "Ithe
premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to
achieve proper self-development--to be a person-an individual
needs some control over resources in the external environment."' Passing over the question of how individuals initially
acquire rights in natural resources, Radin contends that we
express our personalities through our acquisition, use and
disposal of private property, and that often our personalities
and our property become intertwined. This is not merely to
claim that cars, clothes, pets and the like often speak volumes
about their owners. Radin's point, rather, is that we sometimes
become bound up with property to such a degree that its loss
would cause us pain which could not be relieved by replacement of the object with other goods of equal market value.
Property with which we are bound up to this degree is, in
Radin's terms, personal property, and is to be contrasted with
fungible property, which has a purely economic or instrumen-

can become bound up with external objects can be related to Hegal, who argued in

his Philosophy of Right that placing the will into an object takes the pearon from
the abstract to the actual," but also that she does "not mean to take Hegel as a
theoretical foundation for [her] view, but only as a suggestive text." RADIN, REIN-

TERPRLIG PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 7-8.
'" See Ma-y T. Clark An Inquiry into Perconhood, 46 REV.

iETAPHYSICS 3

(1992).
On abortion, see Rosemarie Tong, The Perconhood Debate in Abortion: To-

ward a Reconciliation, THE WORLD & I, May 1992, at 494. On corporate resopnsibility, see Michael J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Perconwod, 2 BUSINRSs ETHICs
Q. 435 (1992). On gay and lesbian rights, see Josd Gdmez The Public Expression
of LesbianlGay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1 L. & INEQUAITY 121 (1983).
7 Compare, eg., Lawrence A. Locke, Personhood and Moral Responsibility, 9 L.
& PHIL. 39 (1990) with Marya Schechtnan, Personhood and Personal Identity, 87
J. PHIL. 71 (1990), which in turn might be compared with THOMAS NAGEL, THE
VIEW FROM NoWHERE 28-66 (1986). Cf. also, more generally, Daphna Oycarman,

The Lens of Personhood: Viewing the Self and Others in a Multicultural Society, 65
J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 993 (1993) (on perzonhood as a culturally

contingent concept).
IsRADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 35.
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tal value.
Radin concedes that no bright-line distinction exists between personal and fungible property; rather, there exists "a
continuum from fuangible to personal. Many relationships between persons and things will fall somewhere in the middle of
this continuum." 9 Given that personal property supposedly
has a stronger moral value, and therefore deserves greater
legal protection, than fungible property, determining where a
particular property right falls on this continuum is likely to be
crucial. How are we to arrive at such determinations? The
manner in which individuals become bound up with, and identify and develop their characters through objects is, Radin
states, inevitably subjective. It may be possible, nevertheless,
to formulate "objective criteria differentiating good from bad
identification with objects in order to identify a realm of personal property deserving [legal] recognition."0 Fulfilling this
possibility requires "a theory of the good or well-developed
person, or a concept of human flourishing... to tell when
objects are appropriately treated as personal.""' But Radin
offers no such theory. Throughout her writings, she refers frequently to "fully developed" persons and an "appropriate
conception" of human flourishing. But such terms are not explained. The theory of personhood which Radin deems so important to her theory of property never materialises.
Rather than present a theory of personhood, Radin tries to
explain the concept by stating what it is not. Property rights
ought not to be regarded as personal, she claims, where the
nature of the relationship between person and thing is inimical
to the development of "healthy self-constitution." Elaborating
on this claim, she observes that "[wle can tell the difference between personal property and fetishism the same way we can
tell the difference between a healthy person and a sick person,
or between a sane person and an insane person." Leaving aside
the remarkable assumption that physical and mental illnesses
are invariably visible, there is the question of whom "we"
might be. Radin deliberately uses the word "we" to suggest
"that a consensus exists" which constitutes "a sufficient source
"

RADIN, REINTeRPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 53.

20 RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 38.
21 RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 198.
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of objective moral criteria" concerning what ought to be legally
protected as personal property. "[A] 'thing' that someone claims
to be bound up with... should not be treated as personal," she
states, "when there is an objective moral consensus that to be
bound up with that category of 'thing' is inconsistent with
personhood or healthy self-constitution." ' This proposition is
circular: healthy self-constitution, for Radin, is that condition
which "we" identify as healthy self-constitution. It is not clear,
furthermore, how "we"-however defined-might represent a
source of objective moral consensus.' As Radin herself
recognises, communities rarely if ever speak with a single
ethical and political voice.'
That the relationship between property rights and
personhood is characterised by a distinct lack of consensus
becomes particularly clear when one considers certain of the
claims which Radin herself makes. The peculiar proprietary
tastes of the "private fetishist" she asserts, ought to be regarded as merely fimgible rather than personal, because a fetish is
an indication that one has become bound up with an object in
a manner which people generally would consider unhealthy.'
That an individual has an unhealthy obsession with a particular category of objects, however, does not necessarily mean
that he or she should be denied personal property rights in
such objects. If my shoe fetish causes me to collect footwear in
abundance, my property rights in what I collect ought surely--assuming my obsession causes no harm to others-to be
treated in law as personal property rights. Still more questionable is Radin's assumption that, generally speaking, rights in
personal property have a greater value and therefore deserve
2

RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 43.

2

See generally Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragnatisnm A Critique of

Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1993); see also

Frank I. Michelman, Private Personal but Not Split: Radin Vrcua Rorty, 63 So.
CAL L. REV. 1783, 1791 (1990).
2RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 240 n.96; see also Margaret J. Radin, Lacking a Transformative Social Theory: A Response, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 409, 415 n.25, 422-23 (1993), where she purports to reject the conensus assumptions to be found in her earlier essays. Such assumptions are still implicit,

however, even in her most recent writings. See, eg. Margaret J. Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1885 (1987) (claiming that "market rhetoric
does violence to our conception of human flourishing") (hereinafter "Market Inalienability-).
2RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 43-44.
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greater legal protection than rights in fungible property. Despite her occasional references to a continuum, she seems generally content to make a crude distinction between fungible
and personal, and to proclaim the former to be inferior to the
latter. "Object loss," she proclaims, "is more important than
wealth loss because object loss is specially related to
personhood in a way that wealth loss is not."16 I cannot see
that this will always be the case. To lose a pair of socks, for
example, might leave one less personally affected than if one
were to lose the cash equivalent of those socks. Without either
a theory of personhood or a set of objective criteria on which to
base her argument, Radin's proposition that the personal is
more important than the fungible stands or falls on the degree
to which it commands intuitive appeal.
Radin attempts to demonstrate the intuitive appeal of her
argument by applying it to the subject of rent control. During
the 1960s and 1970s, there occurred in the United States what
various commentators have termed a "revolution" in residential
landlord and tenant law. Courts and legislatures began increasingly to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship, and in
particular to accord new protections to tenants.' It is also
notable that, around this time, there occurred a significant
reduction in the supply of low-rental private-sector accommodation. While it is difficult to determine the reasons for this
reduction,' various commentators suggest that the contrac-

21

RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 65.

" See generally Charles Donahue, Jr., Change in the American Law of Land-

lord and Tenant, 37 MOD. L. REV. 242 (1974); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982).
'

In the context of the United States, it is important to take into account not

only that very little public-sector housing exists but also that the size of the mar-

ket in low-rental private-sector accommodation is likely to depend on the degree to
which housing code programmes are enforced. See generally Neil K. Komesar, The
Revolution in Landlord-TenantLaw: A ComparativeInstitutional View, 69 CORNELL
L. REV. 612 (1984); Richard F. Muth, Redistribution of Income through Regulation
in Housing, 32 EMORY L.J. 691 (1983); On housing code programmes and the

problem of their enforcement, see Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE LJi. 1093 (1971); Neil K. Komesar, Return to
Slumville: A Critique of the Acherman Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and
the Poor, 82 YALE LJ. 1175 (1973); Bruce Ackerman, More on Slum Housing and
Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194 (1973);

and, on the impact of the revolution in landlord and tenant law on housing code
enforcement, Samuel B. Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Reme.
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tion of the low-rental market was attributable primarily to inm '
creased implementation and use of rent control legislation.
The counter-productivity of rent control is a familiar theme in
neo-classical economic literature: when supply is outstripped
by demand, so the argument goes, the imposition of rent ceilings can only exacerbate the housing shortage which initially
led to the charging of high rents. 0 Radin rejects this argument against rent control. In doing so, however, she makes no
attempt to undermine the logic implicit in the neo-classical
position. Rather, she endeavours to demonstrate that neo-classical analysis generates an inappropriate valuation of residential tenancy rights.
How is she to demonstrate this point? The demonstration
requires, first of all, that we abandon logic in favour of intuition. "The intuitive general rule," Radin claims, "is that preservation of one's home is a stronger claim than preservation of
one's business;" indeed, it is for this reason that "[miost of
us... feel that a tenant's interest in continuing to live in an
apartment that she has made home for some time seems somehow a stronger or more exigent claim than a commercial
landlord's interest in maintaining the same scope of freedom of
choice regarding lease terms and in maintaining a high profit
margin." To formulate this intuition in terms of personhood:
the tenant's home is a justifiable form of personal property,
"while a landlord's interest is often fungible."'
Like others, I doubt the soundness of this intuition.' Of
dies: An Integraion, 56 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1976).
"See, in particular, Edward IL Rabin, The Revolution in Residential LandlordTenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517 (1984); cce alco
tReolution"c?-Some ComCharles J. Goetz, Wherefore the Landlord-Tenant Law
ments, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 592 (1984); Werner Z. Hirsch, From "Food for
Thought" to "EmpiricalEvidence" about Consequences of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 604 (1984).
&
" For the classic exposition of this argument, see MILTON FRIED=
GEORGE STIGLER, ROOFS OR CEILINGS? THE CURRENT HOUSING PROBLEM (1946).
3 RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 79.
m ADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 84. The use of the
word "often" here is an indication that landlords themselves may have a porsonal
as well as a fungible interest in property-for example, where they live in the
same building as their tenants. Radin also appreciates that come landlords value
the well-being of their tenants over the level of rent which they may be able to
extract from them. She nevertheless recognises that it would be difficult if not
impossible to implement rent control legislation which "create[s] subcategories of
protected landlords." RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 95.
" For the doubts of others, see Timothy J. Brennan, Rights, Market Failure,
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the various objections which might be raised, I should
emphasise five. First, if a protective regulatory strategy is to
be adopted, it might be argued that there is more sense in
implementing regulations which preserve interests in businesses over and above homes, for there is a greater likelihood that
homes will be lost if businesses are not kept afloat. A broader
formulation of this point is that our acquisition and cultivation
of personal property depends upon the existence of a framework which facilitates the acquisition and exchange of fungible
property (money in particular). Second, there is the problem of
determining where particular rights lie on the personal-fungible continuum: consider, for example, the case of the tenant
who sublets-how are we to characterise the sub-lessor's reversionary interest? As personal? Fungible? Both? Third, Radin's
argument seems still more suspect when extended to other
regulatory problems. If applied to mortgages rather than rents,
for example, her argument leads to the conclusion that, since
their interest in the property will invariably be fungible, mortgagees ought to be prevented (even in the event of rising interest rates) from increasing monthly payments, because to permit such an action is likely to be injurious to the personhood of
the mortgagor.' Fourth, given her failure to develop a theory
of personhood and her apparent inability to formulate objective
criteria for determining precisely what ought to be protected as
personal property, Radin's argument amounts to little more
than a call for arbitrary discrimination through regulation. If
and Rent Control: A Comment on Radin, 17 PHIL. & PUB AFF. 66 (1988); Robert

C. Ellickson, Rent Control: A Comment on Olsen, 67 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 947, 95054 (1991); Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 741, 770-74 (1988); Dan Greenberg, Radin on Personhood and
Rent Control, 73 THE MONIST 642 (1990).

" See Brennan, supra, note 33 at 70-71. Consider also, in this context, Radin's
endeavour to connect personhood with the protection of privacy. Just as one's
home is necessarily bound up with oneself, she claims, so also is one's car. While
this latter statement is perhaps unsurprising, coming, as it does, from a former
professor at UCLA, it is nevertheless used to support a rather questionable conclusion: viz, that since cars are personal, "it is as much an intrusion to invade a car
as it is an intrusion to invade a home." RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra

note 13, at 62. The equation of cars and homes in this fashion rather suggests
that Radin has lost her sense of direction somewhere along the personal-fungiblo
continuum. This much becomes clear, I think, if one considers the implications of
her argument with regard to leasehold rights: if cars are personal just as are
homes, then, by analogy, drivers of cars which are leased ought to be protected in
much the same way as Radin would like to see residential tenants protected.
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one does not share Radin's intuition, her argument is really
nothing other than a stark declaration that certain rights-and
therefore the holders of those rights also-are especially valuable and therefore require special protection. Fifth, and finally, Radin assumes that there is a distinct correlation between the value placed on a property right and the extent to
which it ought to be protected: the higher the value of a particular right, the more paternalistic we ought to be in regulating
it. Yet, if the pricing of specific property rights is regulated in
such a way as to disincline those who hold such rights from
selling them, those rights and those who wish to buy them are,
in a sense, being devalued. If, in general, a high value is
placed on private sector residential tenancies, in other words,
the most appropriate means of expressing that valuation is to
implement a (de)regulatory strategy which ensures their greater availability.
Radin attempts to make her position on rent control seem
intuitively more acceptable by suggesting that respect for
personhood is likely, in certain instances, "to have
communitarian roots." 6 "[Plersonhood is fostered by living
within an established community of other persons," she claims,
and tenants often flourish as individuals because they live not
only "in a geographical 'community' but "also [in] a spiritual
'community." The preservation of this general community is
likely to depend on the enactment of rent control laws. "[W]e
are," she asserts, "committed to a right against raising the
price [of housing] to a point that disrupts communities and
causes homelessness.' Since "we should err on the side of

See Epstein, supra note 33, at 771-73.
RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 86.
1RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY supra note 13, at 87-88; and cf. also

Margaret J. Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 818-19
(1989).
3 RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 176. Rodin has received

judicial and academic support on this point. See Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d
1072, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1988); David L. Rozendorf, Homdessness and the Uses of
Theory: An Analysis of Economic and Personality Theories of Property in the Context of Voting Rights and Squatting Rights, 45 U. MLAMH L. REV. 701 (1990-91)
(suggesting that Radin's personhood thesis might be used to advance the cause of

the homeless); though compare Lucie E. White, Representing 'The Real Deal", 45
U. MIAm L. REV. 271 (1990-91) (suggesting that the notion that people cherish
the home as a form of personal property is somewhat undermined by the fact that
American citizens have become generally inured to homelessness).
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community preservation because it is an important value," we
ought generally to favour rent control-otherwise, communities
of tenants "may gradually die off as its departing members["
decontrolled apartments are filled with (presumably richer)
nonmembers. 9 Various assumptions are made here-that laissez-faire policies necessarily raise prices, that the removal of
rent control disrupts communities of tenants, that community
dispersal is always undesirable, and that the notion of a community (even a "spiritual" community) of tenants needs no
explanation."
Even if we were to accept all of these assumptions as justifications for rent regulation, we would still be left with the
question of precisely what degree of regulation might be desirable; for if it is true that community preservation depends
upon rent control, and that communities ought always to be
preserved, it is unclear under what circumstances a landlord
might ever be permitted to raise rents. In attempting to offer
an "all-things-considered analysis" of residential rent regulation,4 ' Radin considers just about everything-apart from the
position of the landlord. "A requirement that every landlord be
able to obtain a reasonable rate of return" on his or her premises, she suggests,
is unjustified. If one is an inefficient supplier, or if one bought one's
capital plant speculatively in a rising market, and then regulation is
imposed upon one's business, there doesn't seem to be any intrinsic
right to remain in that business. Insofar as it is fair to consider the
landlord a business.., it does not follow that the landlord is enti-

tled to remain a landlord under all circumstances. Our intuitions

RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 88-91.
On this last point, Radin states that
[w]ithout a more well-developed theory of community, it is not possible to
outline the indicia of community. But it seems there are particular intuitions we can feel fairly confident about, even without a fully developed
theory. Sometimes, for example, tenants are primarily members of one
ethnic group who interact in ways that form a cohesive and defined
group. On the other hand, perhaps a very high turnover rate might convince us we are not dealing with a real community.
RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 88-89.
This merely raises the problem of what is meant by the term "real community." Students, for example, might sometimes be identified as tenants who live in
communities and yet exhibit high turnover rates. Does this mean that student
communities are unlikely to be "real" communities?
11RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 94.
"
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should tolerate some efficiency losses (exit of marginal landlords to
other businesses) in light of strong personhood claims by tenants, as
long as the landlord's interest is fingible.'

Radin is, of course, correct to state that landlords do not
have a right to remain in their particular business. But what
she apparently fails to appreciate is that if rents were regulated in the manner she advocates-so that landlords could not
justifiably expect a reasonable rate of return on their properties and so that rents could be kept low at the landlord's expense-few, if any, people would want to enter into that business. In basing her argument for residential rent control on
intuitive concerns about the personhood of the tenant, Radin
pays scant attention to the economic interest of the landlord.
Respect and protection for the former, however, demands much
the same for the latter.
The fundamental problem with Radin's analysis of rent
control, to my mind, rests in the fact that she is suggesting
that we take a property right-the leasehold estate-which has
market value, and try to think about how we might devise a
regulatory framework which emphasises its "nonmarket personal significance." 3 While we may acknowledge the personal
dimension of the residential tenancy, the fact of the matter is
that such tenancies are clearly also commodities for market
exchange, and therefore a regulatory framework which
prioritises the personal over the fungible aspect of the landlord-tenant relationship is likely to be considered unsatisfactory. Radin's personhood perspective becomes distinctly more
interesting and challenging, however, once it is developed in
relation to property rights which are not commonly considered
to be commodities-rights, that is, which many would regard as
exclusively personal." To allow such rights to be made the
subject of market exchange, Radin claims, may be injurious to
personhood.45 On what basis, however, might a particular
property right be deemed inappropriate for commodification?
Radin's answer is that such rights ought to be kept outside the
4RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 94-95.
4RADIN, REINTERPRETNG PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 140.
" In much of her more recent work, Radin has tended to talze the porsonhood

perspective along this path. See, e.g., Margaret J. Radin, Juctice and the Market
Domain in NoMos XXXI: MARKES AND JUSTICE, cupra note 8, at 165-97.
" See RADN, REINTERPRETNG PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 196-202.
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market domain when they are very clearly and importantly
bound up with one's personhood.4 6 But we have seen that this
answer is only acceptable if one agrees with Radin's own intuitions concerning where particular property rights lie on the
personal-fungible continuum. In order to delve further into the
relationship between regulation and valuation, therefore, it is
necessary to jettison the vocabulary of personhood and adopt a
different tack.
II.

INCOMMENSURABILITY

Efforts to justify the transfer of private property rights in
accordance with the principle of utility invariably meet with
the objection that this principle, however conceived, cannot
accommodate the diverse ethical concerns which may be relevant to such justifications. The problem with embracing utilitarian theory, in other words, is that it is monistic: that is, it
closes us off not only from the fact that there exists a diversity
of human goods but also from the fact that we do not evaluate
these goods along a single metric." In the conclusion to this
Article, I shall suggest that market-oriented theories, despite
providing monistic valuations of diverse goods, may prove
important and illuminating as a general source of regulatory
jurisprudence and that legal theorists ought to reflect very
carefully before dismissing them. For the moment, however, I
wish only to highlight the limitations of monism.
Monistic theories of value are founded on the notion that
the good may be treated as fundamentally unitary. "In adopting a theory of value," one opponent of such theories claims,
"we adopt a way of understanding and appreciating what is
worthwhile in life and of exploring new possibilities for living.
Monism drastically impoverishes these possibilities" in that
"lilt suppresses the parallel evolution of evaluative distinctions
and sensibilities that make us capable of caring about a rich
variety of things in different ways. ' Monism, then, is unable

RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY, supra note 13, at 200.

See Charles Taylor, The Diversity of Goods, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 330-47 (1985); see also generally ROBERT E.
GOODIN, GREEN POLITICAL THEORY 98-108 (1992); HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON
RIGHTS 166-77 (1994).
"ELzABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 118 (1993).
'

1995]

LAW, MARKETS AND VALUATION

sufficiently to account either for the fact that human beings
place different values on different things or for the fact that
our diverse valuations require diverse modes of valuation. 9
It ought to be stressed that failure to recognise the inevitability of diverse valuations is not the issue here. Recognition of
this inevitability runs throughout a good deal of social, scientific and philosophical-even utilitarian-literature.O The issue,
rather, is one of demonstrating the essential impoverishment
of any theory which attempts to gloss over conflicts and distinctions among diverse valuations by subsuming them under
a single metric. It is often the case that no one measure can be
used properly to value different goods"l for the reason that it
is simply inappropriate to treat those goods as comparable in
terms of their value. In such instances, we might say that such
goods are incommensurable. 2
Monetary valuations illustrate the problem of incommensurability in an especially stark fashion." When friends come
round for a meal, they often bring wine, flowers or some other

See generally ANDERSON, supra note 48, at 44-64, 117-40; MICHAEL STOCKER
PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 165-277 (1990). For a neo-Arstotelian develop-

ment of this theme, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990). For an
attempt to relate Nussbaum's Aristotelian perspective to modern jurisprudential
debate concerning value-incommensurability, see Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of
Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520 (1990).
1 Consider the distinction which Kant makes between price and dignity, and
also Durkheim's discussion of the sacred and the profane as incommensurable domains. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96-97
(translated by HJ. Paton as THE MORAL LAW, HJ. Paton ed., 1967); ML
DURKIIEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 38-40 (Joreph Ward
Swain trans., 1976). As for utilitarianism, see John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism in
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISm 258-59, 289-90 (M. Warnock ed., 1962) (arguing that the principle of utility does not preclude recognition of diverse valuations);

see also JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENr, AND MORAL
IIhPORTANCE 75-92 (1986).
"I This may even be the case where the things being valued are subjected to
the same kind of valuation-for example, valuations of children by their parents,
or valuations of two or more similarly afflicted people with a view to determining
who or which ought to be allocated life-saving scarce resources. On these themes,
see GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); WILLIAM STYRON,
SOPHIE'S CHOICE (1979); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 799 (1994).
2 See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM. 322 (1986).
" For the classic formulation of the argument that money deadens the diversty of human values, see KARL MAIL% ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPI3 OF
1844 124 (Lawrence & Wishart, 1959); see also KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 41 (Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1944).
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token. While we generally accept such gifts, we would be offended if they were instead to offer us the cash equivalent of a
bottle of wine or bunch of flowers. Normally, our friends would
be similarly aghast if, having accepted an invitation to visit
them for a meal, we were to cancel at the last minute and offer
monetary compensation for the inconvenience caused. In such
circumstances, cash valuations-irrespective of how high or low
such valuations may be-are inconsistent with the manner in
which we value friends, and thus we treat the two goods as
incommensurable.'
If one adopts a broader criterion of valuation-utility, say,
instead of money-the problem of incommensurability still
persists. Imagine that one has to decide between attending an
important business meeting and attending the funeral of a
close friend. If I fail to attend the former, I am likely to miss
out on the opportunity to meet certain potentially very lucrative business contacts. If I fail to attend the latter, I am likely
to upset many of my friends. If I consider the problem in terms
of utility-maximisation, it might become clear to me that the
cost of upsetting my friends outweighs the benefit which may
come from making important business contacts, or vice-versa.
The important point is not that considerations of utility may
lead me to a choice, but that resort to such considerations in
making a choice might be considered inappropriate. To use
utility as the basis for determining whether or not to attend
the funeral of a friend again seems inconsistent with the manner in which we value friendship.
At this point, one may raise an objection. Is it not the case
that we often do value incommensurable goods in terms of a
single metric such as money or utility, but that we do so implicitly? While I do not give my friends cash instead of wine,
flowers or birthday presents, for example, I do value their

" The point is expressed more precisely
by Joseph Raz, Value
Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARiSTOTELIMA
SOCIETY 117, 130 (1986) ("If Judy refuses to judge whether she values her friendship with John more or less than she values $1,000,000, she nevertheless does
regard it as worth either more or less or precisely the same as $1,000,000, but
she also values not thinking about this question. Hence her refusal to compare.").

For further efforts at illustration, see Richard Warner, Incommensurability as a
JurisprudentialPuzzle, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147 (1992); Richard Warner, Exdud.
ing Reasons: Impossible Comparisons and the Law, 15 OXF. J. LEG. STUDS. 431
(1995).
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friendship in monetary terms when I decide just how much I
should spend on them. If we make such cash valuations behind
the scenes, as it were, what is wrong with making them explicit? To my mind, the fatalistic argument-that we may as well
make explicit that which we do implicitly-is unconvincing. In
implicitly valuing incommensurable goods in terms of a single
metric, Sunstein observes, an individual "may be showing a
commitment to a certain set of judgments about how relationships and prospects should be valued, and if the trade-offs
were made explicitly, that commitment would be undermined
or even violated.'s Whether valuations are made implicitly or
explicitly, in short, is likely to have symbolic significance; explicit valuations may seem inappropriate in a way that implicit
valuations do not.'
Incommensurability can clearly be articulated in terms of
Radinus personhood thesis. For Radin, the problem of
incommensurability arises when that which is distinctly personal is treated as fungible. The problem arises more generally
when the valuation of particular things (not necessarily property rights 7 ) as commodities is normally considered inappropriate. When incommensurability is formulated in terms of
whether or not it is appropriate to value a particular thing as
a commodity, it has been argued, it becomes a useful concept

Sunstein, supra note 51, at 817.
See Raz, supra note 52, at 348-49:

Many people . .. will leave their spouses for a month to do a job they
do not like in order to earn some money. And yet they will not agree to
leave the spouse for the same month for an offer of money, even a significantly larger sum of money. They will feel indignant that someone
supposes that they are willing to trade the company of their spouse for
money from a stranger.
See also generally ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 26-35 (1993);
Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 So. CAL L. REV. 293 (1991). It is
also worth noting in this context that sometimes, although we permit monetary

valuations of particular activities, we are disinclined to permit the advertising of
those valuations. In

the United Kingdom, for example, barristers, veterinary sur-

geons, stockbrokers and accountants, among others, have resisted the advertising
of prices for the activities in which they engage on the basis that such advertising

might threaten the integrity and ethical responsibilities of their professions. See
ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 128 (1994).
'7 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State.: The Roe of
Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE LJ. 1537, 1566 (1983) (arguing that the treat-

ment of aspiration, diversity, mutuality and civic virtue as commodifiable values
violates liberal principles).
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for criticising the initiatives of those theorists-primarily neoclassical lawyer-economists-who contend that just about anything might profitably be made the subject of market valuation.' Just how useful the concept of incommensurability
might be in this context, however, depends on whether it embodies anything more than diverse individual feelings about
what ought not to be bought and sold.
To pose the problem bluntly: how might we ever determine
that it is inappropriate to value something as a commodity? To
my mind, the argument that the peculiarly personal nature of
certain things may determine that they ought not to be traded,
or that they ought to be the subject of protective regulation
(such as rent control), is unconvincing for the simple reason
that there are plenty of things with a distinctly personal dimension-such as our favourite literature, music, restaurants,
holiday locations and the like-which are very obviously and
very naturally commodified. So personhood cannot determine
what constitutes inappropriate commodification.
Perhaps a more convincing criterion of appropriateness
can be extracted from our examples above concerning equations of cash with friendship. When we explicitly place a cash
value on friendship, we degrade what it means to be friends
with somebody-hence, we deem the valuation to be inappropriate. Accordingly, we might formulate the proposition that a
market valuation is inapt when it degrades or demeans that
which is being valued.59 I would argue that this proposition is
only convincing, however, when we are dealing with extreme
cases in which a market valuation is resorted to without the
consent of those subjected to it and where applying such a
valuation does more harm than good (for example, by causing
a great deal of offence). It is possible to envisage instances
where market valuations, even though they might be considered in some way to demean that which is being valued, are
deemed somehow beneficial, and therefore consented to, by
those subjected to the valuation. In such circumstances, is
there really any validity in the claim that market valuations

' For an attempt to use the concept for this purpose, see generally Sunstein,
supra note 51.
" On the capacity of market valuations to degrade that which is being valued,
see ALLEN BUCHANAN, ETHICS, EFFICIENCY, AND THE MARKET 101-03 (1985).
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are inappropriate because they are demeaning?
I shall address this question by considering arguments for
and against markets in parental rights and human organs.
While I do not quite reach the Nozickian conclusion that individuals should be allowed to bind themselves under whatever
contractual terms they wish,' I argue that critics of market
reasoning have tended to exaggerate the dangers of
commodification. Before I begin to address these issues, however, there is another question which needs at least briefly to be
considered: assuming, for a moment, that some market valuations are inappropriate because they degrade that which is
being valued, what is to be done? Consideration of this question requires that we turn our attention to something which,
for the most part, has featured only implicitly in this Article:
law. It is through the apparatus of the law, after all, that determinations are made as to what may be traded within the
market domain, and under what conditions.
Ill. REGULATION AND VALUATION
Within common-law systems, rules very frequently relate
but obliquely to the values which they serve.6 ' One consequence of this is that the likelihood of particular rules being
applied to determine precise valuations of things is extremely
low. When someone loses an arm in an accident, or when a
river is polluted, the legal system-incapable, as it is, of accommodating diverse modes of valuation-tends to use money as its
metric. Of course, the fact that compensation payments may
not represent precise valuations of that which has been lost or
harmed does not mean that they are degrading.' The imposition of a compensation order, for instance, will often be regarded not merely as an effort to put a price on a nonpecuniary loss
or harm, but as a requirement with a symbolic dimension-a
requirement, that is, which is premised on the belief that the

Cf. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 331 (1974). Sce also infra
note 95 and accompanying text.
6

See NE. Simmonds, Bluntness and Bricolage, in

JURISPRUDENCE: CAM-

BRIDGE ESSAYS 1, 18 (H. Gross & I. 1arison eds., 1992).
2 See Margaret J. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE LJ.
56 (1993); Margaret J. Radin, On the Domain of Mar'et Rhetoric, 16 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 711, 726 (1992).
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tortfeasor ought to renounce something of value for his or her
wrongdoing, even if that thing of value is incommensurable
with the loss or harm which has been sustained. In the face of
incommensurability, in other words, the legal system will often
be used to place a pecuniary value on that which, strictly
speaking, resists such valuations." In such circumstances,
monetary valuations are resorted to faute de mieux.
This is not to suggest that legal systems generate only
monistic valuations, or that the only reliable mode of computation for the lawyer is money. Indeed, this clearly is not the
case. When courts declare damages for breach of contract inadequate and instead award a remedy of specific performance, for
example, they may do so because the plaintiffs entitlement is
considered to be incommensurable with cash valuation.' Given, however, that the repertoire of evaluative tools available
within legal systems is limited-to the extent, indeed, that the
best tool available is usually money-it is important to raise
the question of how legal systems might actually regulate what
are generally considered to be inappropriate valuations of
goods. Since individuals value different things in different
ways, and since legal systems cannot take precise account of
the diversity of human valuations, is it not right to conclude
that people must be permitted to value things in whatever
ways they like?65 In short, is there not too great a risk of er-

See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 820.
See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 843-44. Of course, recognition of value-

incommensurability is only one of the reasons that courts may decide to award
specific performance. On other possible reasons for the use of this remedy, see
Anthony Ogus, Remedies, in CONTRACT LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPARISONS
243, 254-62 (Donald Harris & Denis Tallon eds., 1989).

For a particularly eloquent formulation of this conclusion, see FREIDRICH Au.
GUST VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 59 (1944):
starts from the indisputable
Mhe whole philosophy of individualism ...
fact that the limits of our powers of imagination make it impossible to
include in our scale of values more than a sector of the needs of the
whole society, and that, since, strictly speaking, scales of value can exi2t
only in individual minds, nothing but partial scales of value exist-scales
which are inevitably different and often inconsistent with each other.

From this the individualist concludes that the individuals should be allowed, within defined limits; to follow their own values and preferences
rather than somebody else's; that within these spheres the individual's

system of ends should be supreme and not subject to any dictation by
others.
Hayek of course recognizes that, while people may value things in whatever ways
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ror if we try to use the legal system to determine that certain
valuations of things are inappropriate?
That the law will determine certain valuations to be inappropriate is inevitable. For example, legal systems place prohibitions on particular acts-such as theft, rape and murder
-which reflect the actor's improper valuation of the life and
well-being of others. Peculiar regulatory dilemmas arise, however, when we consider actions which-although they may be
regarded in some way to represent an improper valuation of
others-are consented to by those who are (or who own that
which is) subjected to the valuation. In such instances, the law
may be used to regulate the disposition and use of that which
is being valued-for instance, by prescribing preconditions for
its valid transfer, or even by declaring it to be inalienable.
Where the law does place restrictions on alienability, it
will not necessarily do so because unrestrained alienation
would encourage inappropriate valuations. Restrictions on
alienability may be imposed for paternalistic reasons (for example, because certain individuals are considered unable to
determine whether particular exchanges will be in their best
interests67 ), or in order to correct market failures (for example, by bringing about what the market itself would achieve in
the absence of transaction costs or collective-action problems'), or in order to achieve or support distributive goals
(for example, where there exists a fear that the absence of
restriction will exacerbate inequalities of wealth 9 ). Where
they like, this does not mean that they may do whatever they like. Certain human actions which might generally be considered to represent improper valuations
of others-such as theft, rape and murder-are understandably outlawed, I would
argue, not primarily because of the values which they entail but because they
usually harm, and are normally not accompanied by the consent o1 those to whom
they are directed.
On inalienable rights, see Diana T. Meyers, The Rationale for Inalienable
Rights in Moral Systems, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 127 (1981); Terrenco McConnell,
The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights, 3 L. & PHILOS. 25 (1984).
See GUIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOIC
ANALYSIS 55-67 (1970); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 786-97 (1983).
See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rulea,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-15
(1972); Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 978-

88 (1985).
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Thcory of Propry Rights,
85 COLUm. L. REV. 931, 960-61 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional
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avoidance of inappropriate valuation is the reason-or one of
the reasons-for a restriction on alienability, the relevant mode
of valuation will almost invariably be market-based and the
restriction will nearly always determine that the object of
valuation is not commensurable with other objects and therefore ought not to be traded on markets at all. We have already
seen, however, that claims of incommensurability are likely to
be contestable. Accordingly, while there may often exist more
than one reason for imposing a restriction on alienability,
where one of the reasons for the imposition is the apparent
inappropriateness of market valuation, it is important to consider precisely why such valuation is deemed inappropriate.
Given that restraints on alienation tend to be justified for a
variety of reasons, it seems almost inevitable that legal systems will never permit people to value just about anything
however they like-even if we disregard those instances where
valuation is not accompanied by consent. But insofar as such
restraints are justified on the basis of incommensurability, we
ought to consider to what degree, if at all, market valuations
really are inappropriate.
IV. JUDGING MARKETS
Apart from restraining alienation, legal rules may protect
rights in other ways. In their classic article on this subject,
Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed contend that rights,
besides being protected by inalienability rules, may be protected by liability and property rules. A right is protected by a
liability rule if it can be taken upon payment of compensation,
while it is protected by a property rule if it can be taken only
through voluntary exchange. For Calabresi and Melamed,
incommensurability provides the key to understanding the
differences between these two types of rules. A rule establishing that thieves should be punished by charging them the
market value of that which they steal would be inappropriate
not simply because thieves often evade capture, but because
market compensation alone is likely to be an inadequate penalty for the theft. According to Calabresi and Melamed, "Tiability rules represent only an approximation of the value of the
Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1483-84 (1989).
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object to its original owner and willingness to pay such an approximate value is no indication that it is worth more to the
thief than to the owner." 0 Property rules are thus not collapsible into liability rules.
Recognition of incommensurability may also lead us to the
conclusion that certain rights ought to be protected by neither
liability nor property rules but by inalienability rules. "[We
would not presume collectively and objectively to value the cost
of a rape to the victim against the benefit to the rapist even if
economic efficiency is our sole motive" for "when we approach
bodily integrity we are getting close to areas where we do not
let the entitlement be sold at all ...... In order to deter the
inappropriate commodification of particular rights, Calabresi
and Melamed conclude, we supplement them with "an undefinable kicker which represents society's need to keep all property
rules from being changed at will into liability rules."
This "kicker"--an example of which would be the imposition of a criminal sanction to ensure that a particular right
cannot be taken according to one's willingness to pay for it-is
indefinable because it is based on the notion of inappropriate
valuation, and there exists in this context no single criterion of
appropriateness. Although Calabresi and Melamed relate the
issue of indefinability specifically to the distinction between
liability and property rules, it is just as important for the purpose of considering rules concerning inalienability. Indeed,
their analysis puts us in a position to formulate more precisely
a question which we have raised but have yet to address:
namely, if appropriateness resists definition, can there ever be
any justification for preventing, or regulating the terms of,
transactions which, although considered by many people to
embody inappropriate valuations, are consented to by the relevant parties? Of course, the simple answer to this question is
that regulation in such instances may be introduced for reasons other than incommensurability-in order to avert market
failure, prevent exploitation, encourage wealth-redistribution
or whatever. But insofar as incommensurability does serve as
a reason for regulating exchanges accompanied by consent, can

Calabresi & Mfelamed, supra note 68, at 1125.

"

'

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 68, at 1125.
Calabresi & Mfelamed, supra note 68, at 1126.
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it ever prove acceptable? Let us consider this question by focusing on two debates.
A. ParentalRights and Reproductive Capacities
In the late 1970s, Elisabeth Landes and Richard Posner
wrote a now famous article in which they proposed that certain
American adoption agencies should, on an experimental basis,
be permitted to use surplus income generated by their adoption fees to pay women contemplating abortion to have the
baby instead and put it up for adoption. Landes and Posner
argued that such an experiment, if implemented, might
maximise wealth at various levels. In cases of unwanted pregnancy, women will be provided with an extra option-that is,
with an incentive neither to abort nor to raise the baby in
burdensome circumstances. Since the existence of such an
incentive should ensure an increase in the number of children
available for adoption the range of choice available to prospective adoptive parents' will also be increased. The experiment
would represent, in short, a "tentative and reversible step[ ]
towards a free baby market."7 3
Although Landes and Posner were arguing only for partial
and experimental deregulation of the adoptions system, their
suggestion met with a good deal of opposition. Swift's proposal
for the commodification of unwanted children was classic satire.?4 Landes and Posner, in contrast, were using neo-classical
economic methodology to support an apparently serious argument in favour of baby-selling. If such sales were permitted,
critics objected, the market system would exploit the poor and
the vulnerable, babies would probably be bought and sold for
immoral purposes, pricing would be affected by factors such as
skin colour and disability and the wealthy would undoubtedly
buy the "best" babies.7 5 The term "baby-selling," Posner has

I Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 347 (1978).
" Jonathan Swift, A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor Peo.
ple from Being a Burthen to their Parents or the Country, and for Making them
Beneficial to the Public, in JONATHAN SWIFr: A CRITICAL EDITION OF THE MAJOR
WORKS 429-99 (A. Ross & D. Woolley, eds. 1984).
7' For these and other objections, see NANCY C. BAKER, BABYSELLING: THE
SCANDAL OF BLACK-MARKrr ADOPTION 43 (1978) (arguing that the most likely
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subsequently observed, is misleading, since in the partially
deregulated adoptions market the subject of sale would not be
babies-the Landes and Posner proposal does not accommodate
slavery-but parental rights over babies1 6 Posner has argued,
furthermore, that many of the objections to the proposal are
simply borne of misinterpretation and exaggeration. The proposal does not entail doing away with laws prohibiting child
abuse, nor is it a recommendation that all laws forbidding the
sale of parental rights be abolished. More importantly, those
who highlight the possible objections to the proposal tend to
pay little attention either to the fact that adoptions markets-albeit stringently regulated-already exist, or to the fact
that deregulation of those markets may reduce the disparity
between the demand for and supply of babies for adoption."
There is one objection, however, with which Posner apparently feels unable to engage. It is impossible to argue with
people, he is reported to have said, if they take the view that it
is simply inappropriate to treat parental rights as commodities. 8 For two reasons, this admission might be considered
victims of adoptions markets are poor women, especially girls in their early teens);

Jane M. Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimbim, 67 B.U. L. REV. 105 (1987);
Tamar Frankel & Francis I. Miller, The Inapplicability of Market Theory to Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 99 (1987); William J. Pierce, Baby Auction, WALL ST. J,
Aug. 22, 1986, at 16 (suggesting that baby-selling may carve the interests of child

pornographers). For more measured critiques of the Landes and Posner proposal,
see Ronald A. Cass, Coping With Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner
and the Law-and-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. REV. 73 (1987); J. Robert S.
Prichard, A Market for Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341, 347-55 (1984).

"' POSNER, supra note 11, at 410. It is implicit in Posnr's emphasis on parental rights as the subject of market transactions that one understands parental
rights not simply as proprietary rights held by parents over children, but as rights

which serve also to determine that which belongs to the child rather than to the
parent. On the distinction between parental rights as property rights and parental
rights as paternalistic rights, see Jonathan Miontgomery, Children as Property?, 51
MOD. L. REV. 323-342 (1988); and, more generally, on the grey area dividing the

rights of the parent and the rights of the child, see also J. Eekolaar, What are
Parental Rights?, 89 LAW. Q. REV. 210 (1973); J.C. Heall, The Waning of Parental
Rights, 31 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 248 (1972).
See Richard A. Posner, Mischaracterized Views, 69 JUDICATURE 321 (1936);

Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 5972 (1987); see also, on adoptions markets, George Villiam, Myer, Jr., Independent
Adoptions: Is the Black and White Beginning to Appear in the Controversy Over
Gray-Market Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 629 (1980); Margaret V. Turano, Note,
Black-Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAW. 48 (1976).
"IThere are] people for whom the idea of a price tag on babies has a horrible symbolic resonance. I can't really quarrel with them if that's how they feel."
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particularly important. First of all, it illustrates a point to
which I shall return: that even those who are especially vigorous in promoting the application of market valuations tend to
concede that such an approach has definite limitations. Secondly, and still more importantly, it suggests that even if we
can demonstrate the likelihood of a particular deregulatory
strategy generating overall efficiency gains, that strategy may
still be considered undesirable. The reason for this, I think, is
that regulation often serves a largely symbolic function. Efforts
to prohibit certain "harmful" activities (such as euthanasia or
the use of cannabis) are often less than successful-and there
may exist considerable feeling that those efforts at prohibition
are difficult if not impossible to justify, given the range of
activities which are permitted and yet which seem just as (if
not more) harmful than those which are outlawed-yet it seems
that prohibition of those activities is retained largely because
many people are uncomfortable with the image of a society in
which they are not prohibited. In consequence, the retention of
inefficient regulation will sometimes be preferred over deregulation.
That deregulation is sometimes resisted largely for symbolic reasons-that many people may dislike the vision of a
society in which, for example, parental rights are treated as
commodities-does not lead to the conclusion that incommensurability-based objections to market reasoning ought always
to be respected. Indeed, Posner's observation that it is impossible to argue with those who consider it totally inappropriate to
commodify parental rights represents not a concession but
recognition of the fact that such people leave no room for debate. My own view is that the commodification of parental
rights is very much a matter for debate. To allow the purchase
and sale of parental rights is likely to generate a variety of
costs and benefits, and it is simply arbitrary to conclude that
the potentially degrading effects of inappropriate valuation
necessarily weigh heavier than all other considerations.
Consider this argument in relation to surrogacy arrangeComment attributed to Richard Posner in Theodore Roth, Law and Economics, U.
CM. MAG. Aug. 1991, at 31. For examples of the anti-commodification objection,

see Prichard, supra note 75, at 352; Frankel & Miller, supra note 75, at 101-03;
Margaret J. Radin, Reflections on Objectiftcation, 65 So. CAL. L. REV. 341, 349-51
(1991).
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ments. 9 The incommensurability-based objection to commercial surrogacy is quite simple: to allow people (usually a couple) to pay a woman to undertake the labour of pregnancy in
order to bear a child which they can raise as their own is to
permit an inappropriate valuation of both children and
women's reproductive capacities.8 The commercial surrogate
mother, in selling her reproductive capabilities, commodifies
and thereby degrades both herself and the child or children
she produces. Commodification is considered degrading in this
context because market norms take priority over parental
norms. Whereas Landes and Posner proposed the sale of parental rights over unwanted babies, commercial surrogacy is
more calculated in that the natural mother deliberately conceives a child for material advantage."1 Furthermore, surrogacy concerns rights over the unborn. This fact may encourage an
even more inappropriate valuation of children than one might
find in a partially deregulated adoption market, for if commercial surrogacy is permitted, there arises the issue of how to
define the subject-matter of the contract. Adopting parents are
acquiring more than just a child; they are acquiring a child
with specific attributes. Yet, under commercial surrogacy arrangements, the scope for determining whether the child will
possess the attributes desired by the adopting parents is more
limited than under conventional adoption arrangements. 2 To
express the point in market language, commercial surrogacy
arrangements are contracts for the supply of goods, the quality
" Surrogacy is a misleading term in that the surrogate mother is typically the

genetic and gestational mother rather than a surrogate. Moreover, the developmsnt
of in vitro fertilisation has tangled the notion of surrogacy even further in that
the commissioning parents under an IVF asurrogacyl arrangewmnt might also be
the genetic parents. See Gifllian Douglas & N.V. Lowe, Becoming a Parent in English Law, 108 LAW Q. REV. 414, 415 (1992). It is also worth noting here that, in

the discussion which follows, I am concerned only with commercial (as opposed to
unpaid) surrogacy arrangements.
I See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Wonn's Labor a Commodity?, 19

PML. & PUB. AFF. 71 (1990).
u See Herbert T. Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting,13 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 35, 35-37 (1983).

1 Under "a market in reproductive services," it has been argucd, '11ll per-onal
attributes of ourselves as well as our children (sex, eye color, predicted IQ and
athletic ability, and so forth) would be given a dollar value by the market, whether or not we wanted to regard ourselves and our progeny in theze to=s. AM.
Capron & Margaret J. Radin, Choosing Family Law ouer Contract Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 J. OF L., MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 36 (1988).
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of which cannot be determined in advance. If those goods turn
out to be of a quality inferior to that anticipated and desired
by the buyers, they may not wish to take possession of and
assume responsibility for them; and since the sellers produced
these "inferior" goods specifically for the buyers, they too are
unlikely to want to keep them.
To my mind, this incommensurability-based objection to
commercial surrogacy is unconvincing. In essence, the objection
is alarmist, based, as it is, on an improbably bleak vision of
unemotional natural and adoptive parents treating children as
chattels. 'To demonstrate the unacceptability of commercial
reproduction and transactions in children," Capron and Radin
assert, "one need only imagine the market carried to its natural conclusion," that is, as "an open, structured process of offering children of all ages to the highest qualified bidders."83 In
another context, Radin uses much the same strategy to
criticise markets in sexual services:
What if sex were fully and openly commodified? Suppose newspapers, radio, TV, and billboards advertised sexual services as imaginatively and vividly as they advertise computer services, health
clubs, or soft drinks. Suppose the sexual partner of your choice could
be ordered through a catalogue, or through a large brokerage firm
that has an '800' number, or at a trade show, or in a local showroom .... A change would occur in everyone's discourse about sex,

and in particular about women's sexuality."

Such examples, I would argue, demonstrate nothing at all,
for the simple reason that they caricature market activity and
represent arguments which no one promotes. It is also quite
ironic that the incommensurability perspective, while it

Capron & Radin, supra note 82, at 36.
Market Inalienability, supra note 24, at 1922. Radin paints what I
consider to be a similarly alarmist picture when she assesses the risks involved in
establishing markets in parental rights. See Margaret J. Radin, What, if Anything,
Is Wrong with Baby Selling?, 26 PAC. L. J. 135, 144-45 (1995):
If a baby is the object of a market exchange, there may be an effect on
that child's self conception when he or she grows up. You know your
parents paid money for you, maybe enough to have bought a BMW, but

"Radin,

not enough to have bought a house .... This equates your whole self to
a dollar value .... Furthermore, kids talk to each other ... John,

down the street, his parents bought him for as much as a BMW, so my
son could say, Am I worth a BMW? How much would you pay for me?
It's possible, in other words, that this way of thinking about children
could spread.
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emphasises the dignity and value of persons, in fact depends
on a peculiarly one-dimensional--one might even say demeaning-image of surrogate mothers and adoptive parents. The
assumption that neither party to a commercial surrogacy arrangement would want to keep a child which is considered to
be in some way "defective" is especially problematic. The more
usual problem with surrogacy arrangements is that natural
mothers tend to suffer distress and intense regret when the
time comes to surrender the baby.' Certainly the unwantedchild scenario may arise-and when it does arise, it will be very
difficult to determine what to do. But it is a scenario which
is just as likely to arise in relation to non-commercial surrogacy arrangements. Representatives of the incommensurability
perspective are nevertheless content, by and large, to permit
unpaid surrogacy.' Insofar as the unwanted child scenario
represents a real problem, it is a problem which relates to
surrogacy in general rather than specifically to its commercialisation.
Also questionable is the claim that commercial surrogacy
degrades women. The assumption on which this claim is based
is that a woman's reproductive labour is integral to herself and
therefore ought not to be commodifled. But this is a nonsequitur. There are plenty of things which are integral to ourselves-our abilities and talents as teachers, athletes, musicians, artists and so on-which we readily commodify without
suffering degradation. It is far from obvious that a woman's
See In re Baby Al, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Barbara Cohen, Surrogate
Mothers: Whose Baby Is It?, 10 AM. J. OF L. & MEDICINE 243 (1984) (arguing that
courts ought to treat surrogacy contracts as revocable pro-birth agreements which
allow the natural mother to keep the child if she experiences regret); Philip J.
Parker, Surrogate Motherhood: The Interaction of Litigation, Legication and Pqy.
chiatry, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 341 (1982).
'r See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 103-06 (1988). According to
-urrega.
Field, in those instances where, for whatever reason, neither party to the
cy arrangement wants the child once it is born, 'there is a strong policy argument
that the couple who promised to adopt should not be permitted to withdraw from
the contract if the mother attempts to turn the child over to them." Id. at 105. Of
course, insisting on the enforceability of the contract is all very well, except that
such insistence cannot detract from the fact that the child remains unwanted.
a'See, e.g. Capron & Eadin, supra note 82, at 34.
See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 209.18 (1938); cee alco M RY
WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN FERTILIZATION
AND EMBRYOLOGY 45 (1985) ("[lit is inconsistent with human dignity that a woman should use her uterus for financial profit").
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choice to market her reproductive capabilities should be considered any differently. 9 Not only might the legitimation of commercial surrogacy improve general social welfare by providing
greater opportunities for parenthood for those unable to conceive children," but it may empower women in particular by
providing many of them with a source of potential wealth
which is not available to men.9 To express this line of argument at a more general level, commodification, even when
considered to be a peculiar or inappropriate form of valuation,
may nevertheless enhance freedom and welfare.92 From this it
follows that the restriction or prohibition of commodification
may reduce opportunities for the advancement of freedom and
welfare." It is my view that any such restriction or prohibition is necessarily rendered suspect by the presence of genuine

' See Richard J. Arneson, Commodification and Commercial Surrogacy, 21
PHIL & PUB. AFF. 132, 153-54 (1992); Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Reproduc.
tive Labor, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 114-15 (1992); see generally JOHN HARIS,
THE VALUE OF LIFE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL ETHICS 136-56 (1985).
"*

See Avi Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COLUM.

J. L. & Soc. PROBs 1, 15-17 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics

of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. OF CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POLY 21, 27 (1989); Karen M. Sly, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mother's
Right to "Rent Her Womb" for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REV. 539, 549-51 (1983).
91 This is the thesis to be found in CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: TnE CAsE

FOR SURROGACY (1989). The possibility is also conceded in Radin, Market Alienabil.
ity, supra note 24, at 1915-17. Compare Anita L. Allen, Surrogacy, Slavery, and
the Ownership of Life, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 139 at 147-48 (1990) ("One
strains to see female liberation in a practice that pays so little, capitalizes on the
traditionally female virtues of self-sacrifice and caretaking, and enables men to
have biologically related children without the burden of marriage."). Various commentators on earlier drafts of this article urged me at this point to draw an analogy between women's reproductive capabilities and sperm: why, in short, does
there exist a general reluctance to commodify the former but not the latter? I am
not convinced that the analogy is at all illuminating. The principal reason that
sperm is more readily commodified, I should have thought, is that, as compared
with the capacity to reproduce, it is more readily commodifiable. Pateman captures
the point in part (though not, I feel, entirely) when she states that, "[u]nlike
labour power, sexual parts, the uterus, or any other property that is contracted
out for use by another, sperm can be separated from the body." PATEMAN, supra
note 88, at 217.
'2 See generally MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 23-57 (1993); see also Sunstein, supra note 51, at 805 ("[lt is ... plausible

to see incommensurability as constitutive of some valuable forms of freedom").
' See Radin, Market-Inalienability,supra note 24, at 1921-22; see also generally
Eric Mack, Dominos and the Fear of Commodification in NoMoS XXXI: THICS,
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 198-225 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds.,

1989).
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consent.' That is, if there exist people who are willingly prepared to agree to what are generally considered to be inappropriate valuations-who are willing to trade, say, their parental
rights or their reproductive capabilities in order to benefit
themselves and others-then the restriction or prohibition of
the relevant activity is difficult to justify. 5
There are two points which ought to be raised in relation to this statement.
The first is that it demands that one address the issue of what constitutes
"genuine" consent. Many legal theorists emphasize that, where the parties to an
exchange enjoy disproportionate levels of bargaining power, consent will sometimes
conceal coercion. For the classic articulation of this point, see Robert L. Hale,
Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POL SCI. Q. 470
(1923). ly own feeling is that this argument ought to be treated with a certain
amount of caution. Although economic choices may be restricted by economic capacity, this does not mean that such choices are not genuinely consented to. Limited bargaining power may force people out of (or, more likely, preclude them from
entering) certain markets and thereby confine them to others, but that hardly
means that those people do not consent to the transactions which they make within those markets in which they are able to participate. Could I afford it, I would
drive a Mercedes. That does not mean, however, that I did not genuinely consent
to the transaction when I bought my Volkswagen. my limited bargaining power
compels me to participate in one market, or at one market level, rather than
another;, but this compulsion does not denote an absence of genuine consent.
While I am prepared to try to defend the possibility of genuine consent, what
I would not deny is the fact that consent does not necessarily facilitate gains in
welfare. Factors such as lack of information or peculiarity of preferences may load
a person to consent to transactions which leave him or her worse rather than
better off. The presence of consent, in other words, ought not to be automatically
equated with improvements in autonomy and well-being. On this particular point,
see Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Concent in the
Moral and Political VTisions of Franz Kafka and Richard Poener, 99 HARV. L. REV.
384 (1985).
The second point which ought to be raised regarding concant-and here, rather than try to defend my argument, I can only concede one of its esential limitations--is that consent is sometimes irrelevant to incommensurability-bazed objections to commodification. There are some things which do not have the capacity to
consent to the process of commodification and yet which may b3 degraded by that
very process. There may exist strong feelings, for example, that the creation of
markets in pollution rights encourages environmental degradation by macing polluting activities permissible at a price. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
One can hardly defend such activities by developing an argument based on consent, for the environment does not have the capacity to consent. Much the same
point may be made in relation to the degradation of animals. On the environmental theme, see Nathalie Boucquey, Hot Spots in the Bubble: Eco!ogical Liability in
Markets for Pollution Rights, in ENVIRONmENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL RE8PON3IBHIITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-ORGANIZATION 49-74 (G.

Teubner et al. eds., 1994).
1 An activity such as commercial surrogacy might, of course, be objected to on
grounds other than incommensurability-for example, because it is considered
exploitative, or because it fails to take into account the interests of the chld. See
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B. Human Tissues and Organs
Even if it were possible to demonstrate in a particular
context that commodification is an inappropriate mode of valuation, it does not necessarily follow that commodification ought
thereby to be restricted or prohibited. Just as the perceived
wrongfulness of a particular activity may not preclude the
possibility of our having a right to engage in that activity,"
identification of incommensurability is unlikely in itself to
constitute a good reason for regulating market exchanges.'
This is not to conclude that incommensurability-based
objections to market exchanges will always be unsound. I have
emphasised that the presence of consent to such exchanges is
an important factor in overriding considerations of
incommensurability. It might also be possible to envisage extreme instances in which commodification may be considered
an inappropriate mode of valuation despite the presence of
consent.98 By and large, however, arguments for restricting or
generally Satz, supra note 89. While my concern here is specifically with
incommensurability as a basis for precluding or regulating particular market exchanges, it ought at least to be mentioned that objections such as these are hardly
unproblematic. For a critique of the exploitation argument, see Alan Wertheimer,
Two Questions about Surrogacy and Exploitation, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFP. 211-239
(1992); and for critiques of the idea that it is possible to ascertain the best interests of the child, see JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 134-50 (1989); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
226 (1975).
96 See Jeremy Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED
PAPERS 1981-1991 63 (1993).

" See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 851 ("[O]pposition to commensurability, and
insistence on diverse kinds of valuation, do not by themselves amount to opposition to market exchange"); Wertheimer, supra note 95, at 218 ("The permissibility
of market transactions does not require that the goods exchanged be commensurable on a single metric"); see also generally Robert P. George, Does the
"Incommensurability Thesis" Imperil Common Sense Moral Judgments?, 37 AM. J.
JURISPRUDENCE 185 (1992).

"' In what circumstances might the commodification of an activity be considered inappropriate despite the presence of consent? In an earlier draft of this
Article, I suggested the example of the circus freak who willingly exhibits his disfigurement for a price. In spite of the presence of consent, I claimed,
commodification in this context seems inappropriate. Various people took me to
task on this point. Why, I was asked, is the circus freak example any more extreme than the proposal to commercialise surrogacy or to permit the sale of human tissues and organs? Does not the example appeal to precisely the sort of
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prohibiting particular market exchanges are unlikely to prove
persuasive when based solely on the identification of
incommensurability.
The debate over whether we should allow markets in human tissues and organs demonstrates, I think, that the persuasiveness of arguments from incommensurability depends in
general on whether or not they are accompanied by other reasons for regulating market exchange. Without attempting to
examine either the types of markets which might be established for the exchange of human tissues and organs or the
fact that certain tissues and organs may be more marketable
than others, we might begin with the generalisation that there
exists considerable support for the commercialisation of human
body materials. It has recently been estimated that between
forty and fifty percent of British people consider the sale of human organs permissible in principle.' Furthermore, covert
market activity in this area is not uncommon,00 and arguments in favour of legitimating market exchanges dominate
the relevant academic literature.'
intuitivism which I object to when assessing Radin's permonhood thesis? The an-

swer that I gave to this objection is that the commodification of parental rights
and human organs is intended to generate significant benefits beyond the gain in
wealth which falls to the seller part of the purpose of allowing then sales, after
all, would be to improve and possibly even to save lives. In contrast, the benefit
to be gained from comodifying the exhibition of disfigurement-the entertainmgnt
or thrill that someone might derive from seeing the circus frea--seems fairly
inconsequential. On reflection, I am not convinced by this argument, not least
because it implies that a line might be drawn between sufficiently beneficial and
insufficiently beneficial commodifications. Inevitably, the matter of where such a
line might be drawn boils down to intuition, and on certain issues-prostitution,
for example-it is possible to envisage widespread disagreement concerning whether or not commodification of the relevant activity generates significant benefits.
While I am far from sure of my ground on this issue, my increasing inclination is
to say that the presence of consent-assuming that consent is a relevant factor-should be taken to justify the commodification of any activity.
' See Astid Guttmann & Ronald D. Guttmann, Attitudes of Health Care Professionals and the Public Towards the Sale of 1idn4es for Transplantation, 19 J.
MED. ETMCS 148 (1993).

"' See RUSSELL ScOTt, THE BODY AS PROPERTY 179-97 (1981); Alexander
Dorozynski, European Kidney Mfarket, 299 BRITISH MED. J. 1182-85 (1989).

"" See, for but a sample of this literature, John Bignall, Kidneys: Buy or Die,
42 LANCET 45 (1993); Marvin Brams, Transplantable Human Organs: Should Their
Sale Be Authorized by State Statutes?, 3 Al. J. L. & MEDICINE 183 (1977); Nancy
L. Buc & Joan Z. Bernstein, Buying and Selling Human Organs is Worth a Harder Look, 1 HIELTH-SCAN 3 (1984); David E. Chapman, Retailing Human Organs
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MRSHALL L. REV. 393 (1983); Lloyd R.
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The principal argument in support of the market system is
simple: reliance on altruism condemns the sick. That is, a
donation-based system' 2 cannot generate a supply of human
0 3 and consequenttissues and organs which matches demand"

Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Organ Transplants: Is
Relying on Altruism Costing Lives?, 4 AM. ENTERPRISE 50 (1993); Henry
Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J.
HEALTH POL., PoLY AND L. 57 (1989); Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics
of Organ Procurement, 12 L. & POLY 197 (1990); Clifton Perry, Human Organs
and the Open Market, 91 ETHICS 63 (1980); Jeffrey M. Prottas, Obtaining Replacements: The Organizational Framework of Organ Procurement, 8 J. HEALTH
POL. POLY & L. 235-50 (1983); Richard Schwindt & Aidan R. Vining, Proposal for
a Future Delivery Market for Transplant Organs, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L.
483 (1986); Susan Hankin Denise, Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71
VA. L. REV. 1015 (1985); Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV.
1182 (1974). It is worth at least noting that the best part of this literature advo.
cates not the sale and transplant of organs from living persons, but only the establishment of markets for inter vivos and cadaveric organs. While the implication
running throughout most of this literature is that the commercialisation of inter
vivos and cadaveric organs would alleviate scarcity to such a degree that it would
not be necessary to permit the sale of organs from living persons, certain representatives of the market perspective recognise also that, were markets in human
organs from living persons to be permitted, the consequences of exploitation and
lack of information in particular could prove catastrophic.
"' It seems to me that a basic problem with the pro-market argument is that
it is usually contrasted with an "opt-in" system of donation-that is, a system
whereby the individual opts to make his or her organs available for transplant on
death. It is, of course, possible that the supply of organs might be increasod by
adopting a system based on presumed consent, whereby individuals are presumed
to have made their organs available on death unless they have explicitly opted out
from such an arrangement. While an opt-out system raises difficult moral issues in
its own right, it may nevertheless be regarded as a means of reducing scarcity
without resorting to the market. For arguments along these lines, see IAN KENNEDY, TREAT ME RIGHT: ESSAYS IN MEDICAL LAW AND ETHICS 237 (1988); William N.

Gerson, Refining the Law of Organ Donation: Lessons from the French Law of
Presumed Consent, 19 N. Y. J. lNL L. & POL. 1013 (1987). For objections to such
a scheme, see Robert A. Sells, Lets Not Opt Out: Kidney Donation and
Transplantation, 5 J. MED. ETHIS 165 (1979).
103 It is interesting, in this regard, to compare early literature on the regulation
of organ transplantation with modem studies on the same theme. Earlier writers
were optimistic that voluntary donations would meet demand. Nowadays, it is
commonly acknowledged that there exists no room for such optimism. Compare
Paul P. Lee, The Organ Supply Dilemma: Acute Responses to a Chronic Shortage,
20 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 363 (1986); Alfred M. Sadler & Blair L. Sadler,
Transplantation and the Law: The Need for Organized Sensitivity, 57 GEO. LJ. 5
(1968); Note, Legal Problems in Donations of Human Tissues to Medical Science,
21 VAND. L. REV. 352 (1968); with Richard lichael Boyce, Organ Transplantation
Crisis: Should the Deficit Be Eliminated Through Inter Vivos Sales?, 17 AKRON L.
REV. 283 (1983);
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ly, under any such system, those in need are more likely to
suffer. A market system would not only alleviate scarcity, but
would ensure significant gains for vendors and recipients alike.
Such a system, moreover, might be defended on philosophical
as well as economic grounds: that is, if one accepts (this, of
course, is a big "if) the Nozickian argument that we possess

alienable property rights in ourselves, it follows that we ought,
in principle, to be able to trade those rights if we so wish.'
Compared with the argument in favour of market exchange, the argument from incommensurability --that it degrades the intrinsic value of humanity to permit the sale of
human tissues and organs 0 --seems remarkably weak. Not
," For such an argument, see Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Property, 16
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 28 (1986); Samuel C. Wheeler I, Natural Property Rights
as Body Rights, 14 NoVs 171 (1980); see also generally STEPHEN IL MUNZER, A
THEORY OF PROPERTY 37-58 (1990); John Cbristman, Can Ownerchip be Justified
by Natural Rights?, 15 PHIL. & PUB. APP. 156, 168 (196). It might also be noted
in this context that Anglo-American law has traditionally exhibited a general disinclination to recognise property rights in the human body. See Raymond D. Cotton & Andrew Sandler, The Regulation of Organ Procurement and Transplantation
in the United States, 7 J. LEGAL MED. 55, 57-75 (1986); Bernard M. Dickens, The
Control of Living Body Materials, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 142 (1977); Paul Matthews,
Whose Body? People as Property, 36 CURRENT LEGAL PROBs. 193 (19S3); Richard J.
Sideman & Eric D. Rosenfeld, Legal Aspects of Tissue Donationsfrom Cadavers, 21
SYRACUSE L. REV. 825, 826-37 (1970).
" For efforts to advance this argument, see Ruth F. Chadwick, The Market for
Bodily Parts:Kant and Duties to Oneself, 6 J. APPLIED PHIL 129 (1989); McCall
Smith, Property,Dignity, and the Human Body, 2 HUME PAPERS ON PUB. POL'V 29
(1994). Steven I Munzer adopts a somewhat more equivocal position in Kant and
Property Rights in Body Parts, 6 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 319 (1993);
Stephen IL Munzer, An Uneasy Case Against Property Rights in Body Parts, in
PROPERTY RIGHTS, 259 (1994). Michelle Bourianoff Brayand developed the
personhood-based analysis in PersonalizingProperty: Toward a Propert Right in
Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990). One argument which, surpfis ngly, appears not to have been put forward by proponents of incommensurability is that
certain of the legal consequences of establishing a market in human tissues and
organs might be considered bizarre, if not grotesque. In the United States, for
example, it has been suggested that if market valuations of the human body were
legally permissible, decedents would be required to include such valuations in their
gross estate for purposes of taxation. See Note, Tax Concequences of Transfers of
Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 842, 862 (1973).
us6

The idea of commodification of human flesh repels us, quite properly I
would say, because we sense that the human body especially belong3 in
that category of things that defy or resist coxamensuration-like love or
friendship or life itself. To claim that these things are "pricelesa' ... is
to claim that the bulk of their meaning and their human worth do not
lend themselves to quantitative measures; for this reason, we hold them
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only is the notion of degradation contestable-why, for example,
might it be considered degrading to sell one's kidney but not
one's thoughts?-but so too is the notion of humanity."° I find
it difficult to see how the market system might above all else
be considered to degrade the intrinsic value of humanity if one
of the main reasons for moving to such a system is to alleviate
human suffering by ensuring an increased supply of organs for
transplantation. °8 One might, of course, formulate other objections to the market system-that the system may be open to
abuse; that it may displace need in favour of ability and willingness to pay; that it may exploit the poor; °9 that it may

to be incommensurable . . . [11f we come to think of ourselves like pork
bellies, pork bellies we will become.
Leon R. Kass, Organs for Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price of Progress, 107
PUB. INTEREST 65, 81-83 (1992). This claim seems alarmist and muddled in equal
measures. In discussing the "commodification of human flesh," Kass at one point
suggests that the sale of human organs is morally no different from cannibalism:
"the human body is treated as mere meat." Id. at 71. Whereas the cannibal will
usually have other sources of nourishment, however, the sale of human organs is
intended, among other things, to increase the supply of a scarce resource, to benefit people who most likely have no other means of benefit.
07 For an exploration of this point in relation to the supply of human organs,
see John Harris, The Survival Lottery, 50 PHIL. 81 (1975).
'0 For an attempt both to defend and to explore the broader implications of
this line of argument, see JOHN HARRIS, WONDERWOMAN AND SUPERMAN: THE
ETHICS OF HuMAN BIOTECHNOLOGY 118-39 (1992). It should be noted, furthermore,
that there rests implicit in the incommensurability-based objection to the market
system the assumption that organ donation as opposed to sale clearly does not degrade humanity. This assumption seems simplistic, especially when one considers
psychological research exploring possible links between organ donation and feelings
of self-degradation. See, e.g., Sidney E. Cleveland, Personality Characteristics,Body
Image and Social Attitudes of Organ Transplant Donors Versus Nondonors, 37
PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 313 (1975) (suggesting that, as compared with non-donors,
organ donors are more willing to accept their mortality but are also likely to display more hostility, depression and guilt). Consider also, in this context,
Hansmann, supra note 101, at 70:
Although it is sometimes suggested that putting a price on human organs would in some way be offensive to our values ... it is important
to keep in mind that any such moral difficulties with a futures market
for organs must be compared with the morality of routinely inflicting
distress on families by forcing them to make an emotionally difficult
decision in the minutes and hours immediately following the death of a
family member and subjecting them to substantial psychological and
social pressure to make that decision in favour of donation.
109

Inevitably, our view on donation for recompense must be coloured by our
experience of a national health service. Within that framework, it is
difficult to see the sale of organs as other than a way for the rich to
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discourage altruistic acts; or that it may generate a supply of
infected materials without providing satisfactory mechanisms
for monitoring quality 1 -but to resort to such objections is to
argue for restrictions or prohibitions on market exchange on
some basis other than incommensurability. In short, in those

instances where money might be considered to represent an
inappropriate mode of valuing a particular good or activity,

arguments from incommensurability alone are unlikely to
justify the regulation of markets.
CONCLUSION: FEAR OF MARKETS

It is easy to see how this Article might be interpreted as
an attempt to glorify markets. But that has not been my objective. I do not deny that there are some things which either
cannot or should not be commodified, nor do I deny that there
sometimes exist powerful symbolic or policy reasons for resisting commodification. I do believe, however, that market reasoning is often misunderstood and even caricatured, that its
dangers are frequently exaggerated and that its capacity to
explain and prescribe is underestimated. In a world dominated

obtain priority essential care, the inequity being compounded by the corollary that the poor, who would form the pool of such donors, would be
positively disadvantaged in the role of supplier.
JOHN K. TASON & RA ]CCALL SMTH, LAW AND MlEDICAL ETHICS 299 (4th ed.,
1994). For a critique of the proposition that a market in human tissues and organs is likely to prove exploitative, see Charles Errin & John Harris, A Monopconistic Market- or How to Buy and Sell Human Organs, Tissues and Cdls Ethically
in, THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF LIFE AND DEATH UNDER HIGH TECHNOLOGY
MEDICINE 134 (L Robinson ed., 1995).
10 The latter two objections-that markets may both discourage altruism and
generate an increased supply of infected product-are presented most often in

relation to the supply of blood. See RICHARD L TIrMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP:
FROMi HUMAN BLOOD TO SOcIAL POLICY 70-75, 142-57, 209-46 (1970); Raymond
Plant, Gifts, Exchanges and the Political Economy of Health Care, 4 J. MED. ETa-

ics 5 (1978); and Peter Singer, Freedoms and Utilities in the Distribution of
Health Care, in MIARKES AND MORALS, supra note 13, at 149-173, 164 ('Th fact

that many people who would otherwise give blood will not do so if it can be
bought should not be ignored or brushed aside. To say that this decision is the
individua's free choice, and that freedom is ma-ximized as long as a person can
give if he chooses to do so, is to take a naive view of the nature of choice.'). On
the market as an incentive to conceal damaging information, rxe Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 354-55 (1972); and, more
generally, George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and
the Market, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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by market valuation, Cass Sunstein has recently warned, "[a]
great deal would be lost.., a life with genuine commensurability would be flat and dehumanised.""' One can only
wonder to whom this warning might be directed. Surely nobody-not even the most staunch Chicago neo-classicist-would
deny the necessity of incommensurability. An altogether different issue is that of what, if anything, ought to be done about
incommensurability. To put the point more specifically, once
incommensurability has been identified, how, if at all, ought it
to be accommodated within the legal framework? According to
Sunstein, "those who favour legal approaches based on unitary
kinds of valuation and commensurability should understand
that their approach is best defended as a means of overcoming
certain institutional obstacles, and not as reflecting a fully
adequate understanding of the relevant problems."" Since
proponents of monism tend to be very clear about the objectives behind and the limitations of the theories to which they
subscribe, one can only wonder, again, to whom such a remark
might be directed. Consider, for example, the monistic theory
of value which Sunstein most likely has in mind, Richard
Posner's theory of wealth-maximisation. "There is," Posner has
conceded,
nothing in the ethic of wealth maximization which says that society
has a duty to help the needy. It has a duty not to hurt them, to
leave them alone; but it has no duty, and in a strict ethic of wealth
maximization no right, to force the productive people to support the
unproductive... In this regard, wealth maximization is ... out of
phase with the powerful currents of contemporary moral feeling...
an incomplete guide to social decision-making."'

For Posner, wealth maximisation, despite its limitations, is
the best ethic available for the purpose of guiding public policy
generally, and the only ethic which the courts in particular can
do much to promote." The contentiousness of this claim is
m Sunstein, supra note 51, at 854.
Sunstein, supra note 51, at 855. Consider also, in this context, Anthony

1

Kronman's argument that the accommodation of incommensurability is necessary to
the pursuit of practical wisdom. ANTHONY T. KONmfAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53-108, 237-38, 338-42 (1993).
1 Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICs & PUB. POLY 85, 101 (1985).
" Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4
INTVL REv. L. & EcON. 131, 133 (1984).
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hardly relevant here. The point to be stressed, rather, is that
Posner, like other market theorists," hardly needs to be
urged to recognise the limitations of monism. Sunstein's claim
that proponents of market reasoning ought to understand the
implications of valuing diverse goods along a unitary metric
seems redundant.
That Sunstein should express such concern over the resort
to market reasoning seems, in a sense, ironic. For, in his writings on environmental law, he demonstrates perhaps better
than anyone else how initial fears over the inappropriateness
of market valuations can sometimes prove ill-founded. In the
United States, he has observed, the idea that it may be feasible and desirable to use the pricing system as a basis for environmental protection has traditionally met with considerable
resistance."6 The essence of the objection is that it is inappropriate to place a cash value on environmental degradation,
since doing so essentially destigmatises particular polluting
activities by making them permissible at a price." But
nowadays, Sunstein observes, it is commonly accepted that
environmental-protection policies are more likely to prove
successful when they are supported by market-based incentives
to reduce pollution rather than by traditional "command-andcontrol" regulation."' In the context of environmental policydevelopment, the language of the market is no longer consid15 See, e.g., JAMES MNL
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOcK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITIONAL DEMOCRACY 270-76 (1962) (discussing vote-selling).
n1 See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 814.
n' See KELMAN, supra note 8, at 27-53; and cf. further Cam . Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEG. STUDS. 217, 247-53 (1993).
"' See Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, DUKE LJ. 607, 634-40 (1991).
For literature supporting Sunstein's point, see Bruce A. Aclhrman & Richard B.
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Cae for Market Inceztives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 188-93 (1988); though compare Robert Howra,
Retrenchment, Reform or Revolution? The Shift to Incentives and the Future of the
Regulatory State, 31 ALBERTA L. REV. 455 (1993); B. Peter Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 EcON. INqUIRY 551
(1985);. For British literature on the question of whether or not the pricing system
provides a better basis for environmental protection than conventional regulation,
see LORD ZUCKERMAN & W. BECEERP2N, MINORITY REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ENVIRONmiETAL POLLUrION (Crmnd. 4894, London: HMSO, 1972), 9I 222; and compare Paul Burrows, Pricing Versus Regulation for Environmental Protection, in ECONOMIC PoucIEs AND SOCIAL GOALS: ASPECTS OF PUBLIC CHOICE
273-83 (A.J. Culyer, ed., 1974).
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ered to be incongruous.
A similar point might be made in relation to the evolution
of life insurance. In the United States during the early part of
the nineteenth century, the commodification of death was considered sacrilegious. The sanctity of human life would be undermined, it was believed, if life itself were made the subject of
commercial speculation."' By the end of the century, however, attitudes had begun to change. With increasing industrialisation and the flourishing of the market economy, economic
valuations of death-and hence the life insurance industry
itself-became gradually more acceptable. Indeed, with the
promotion of life insurance as a form of altruism-as a means,
that is, of providing for one's dependents after death-such
valuations became ever more desirable.' As with the case of
environmental protection, fear of the market had turned out to
be misplaced.
Such examples do not support the conclusion that just
about anything legitimately might be the subject of economic
valuation. But what they do support, I think, is the conclusion
that resistance to market reasoning is often ill-conceived. Certainly, such reasoning has limitations-indeed, given that the
legal, ethical and political issues with which academic lawyers
grapple are so complex and diverse, it is inevitable that economic analysis will often have to be supplemented or even
displaced by other evaluative tools. But this in itself is no
reason to be dismissive or fearful of market reasoning. While
commodification may sometimes seem an inappropriate form of
valuation, it is important that we consider in each instance
whether the benefits of engaging in this form of valuation
might outweigh the apparent costs. The fact that the market
seems perpetually to expand-that we now routinely commodify
things (such as child care and support for the elderly) which
once would have been considered unsuited to the market domain-suggests that these costs often turn out to be bearable if
not immaterial. Creeping commodification, quite simply, is not
necessarily insidious commodification. The potential of market

'" See Viviana A. Zelizer, Human Values and the Market: The Case of Life Insurance and Death in 19th-Century America, 84 AMl.J. SOC. 591, 597-602 (1978).
2 See VIVIANA A. RoTfAN ZELIZER, MORAI AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPbiENT
OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 150-53 (1979).
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reasoning needs to be explored, not resisted."
is, if nothing else, a plea for more exploration.
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On this point, see further TREBILCOCI, supra note 9Z at 241-68.

